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Very few studies exist concerning the economic determinants of retirement age 
in France. Three main reasons may account for this situation. First, a common 
idea is that the French pension system offers little flexibility concerning choice 
of retirement age, with the result that little room is left for estimating economic 
models of retirement behavior. A second explanation is the complexity of the 
pension system, which renders data collection extremely difficult and discour- 
ages efforts to build systematic behavioral models. Third, age at exit from the 
labor force is determined not only by individual preferences and the structure 
of the pension system itself but more and more often by parallel systems such 
as preretirement schemes or specific dispositions of unemployment insurance 
targeted toward older workers, and the development of these schemes reflects 
both  supply- and demand-side effects on the labor market; it may therefore 
appear meaningless to develop behavioral models that remain generally lim- 
ited to supply-side considerations. 
All these explanations are valid, but only partially. Flexibility in the choice 
of retirement age is not great, but still exists: in fact, the basic general regime 
offers the possibility  of  retirement between  the ages of sixty and sixty-five. 
The problems raised by the complexity of the system can then be bypassed, in 
a first attempt, by concentrating on this general regime and associated comple- 
mentary schemes. Finally, if it is indisputable that interactions between supply 
and demand factors in a context of low employment complicate the analysis of 
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retirement behavior, this implies at the same time that this analysis is particu- 
larly worthwhile. The extension of  preretirement schemes in France is prob- 
ably one of the major aspects of our current pension problems; it may limit the 
feasibility  of policies aimed at raising  the  average retirement  age, with the 
result that the question of the structure of incentives generated by this system 
is of particular importance, whatever the channels through which these incen- 
tives finally affect behavior, that is, directly through individuals or indirectly 
through employers. 
It is with these elements in mind that we present here some results concern- 
ing the labor force participation of older workers in France and their link with 
the organization of the pension system. We proceed in three steps: (1)  a general 
description of trends in labor force participation, pension levels, and pension 
coverage; (2) a precise description of the way pensions are computed in the 
basic general regime and the two most important complementary schemes; and 
(3) the simulation of incentives implied by these computation rules. This latter 
section illustrates how simple computations of future benefits help clarify the 
properties of pension rules. But it also shows the importance of what remains 
to be done to give a full explanation of labor force participation at older ages 
and the way that participation could be affected by future or ongoing reforms 
of retirement or preretirement schemes. 
3.1  The Labor Market Behavior of Older Persons in France 
This section is devoted to an analysis of labor force participation  trends 
around retirement age. We first place recent developments in a long-term per- 
spective. Then, concentrating on what has happened since 1968, we show that 
this period has been characterized by an acceleration of the long-run decline 
of the average retirement age and at the same time by the increasing complex- 
ity of the pattern of transition from activity to retirement. 
3.1.1  Long-Term Trends in Labor Force Participation 
We first provide figures-focusing  on male workers to avoid the offsetting 
trends resulting, for women, from increased activity at median ages-for  la- 
bor force participation since the 1920s. Figure 3.1 shows that the decline in la- 
bor force participation at older ages has been a long-term trend. It must be 
noted that this trend has been observed despite the fact that the French popula- 
tion has been aging for most of the century. But this apparent paradox can be 
easily explained by general economic growth. Economic progress resulted in 
a collective income/leisure trade-off  in  favor of  a longer retirement period, 
which had no difficulty outweighing the consequences of  a moderate aging 
process, and this trade-off  was largely  mediated by  the development of pen- 
sion schemes. 
Actually, this decline in labor force participation at older ages occurred in a 
context of  increased coverage and generosity of  the pension  system. Direct 




I  I  I  I  I  I  I  II 
920  1930  1940  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990 19! 
-  Age group 55-59  ----Age  group 60-64 
Fig. 3.1  Participation rate of older men, France, long term 
Source: Marchand and ThClot (1991); Bordes and Guillemot (1994). 
of the pension system in France, there are no systematic series giving numbers 
of beneficiaries or contributors in the whole population. Adding up series that 
exist for the major schemes, we nevertheless get the overall upward trend dis- 
played in figure 3.2. In fact, since 1974, when affiliation with a pension system 
became mandatory, we can consider that coverage is complete. The remaining 
gap between total employment and the number of contributors that appears in 
figure 3.2, therefore, means not that some people remain uncovered but simply 
that they are covered by  basic schemes that do not belong to the list of  nine 
major schemes taken into account for this graph. 
A similar evolution can be observed on the pensioners’ side, as displayed in 
figure 3.3. It should be noted that the interpretation of this figure is complicated 
by the fact that one individual may, over his career, have been covered (succes- 
sively) by more than one basic regime.’ 
Evidence of the increased generosity of the pension system is also given by 
the very crude computation of  the ratio of total old age expenditures, divided 
by the number of  inactive persons over age sixty, to the average net wage in 
the labor force, which is displayed in figure 3.4. The ratio of average benefits 
to average wages increased by about 60 percent between  1950 and  1974 and 
continued to increase after the complete generalization of coverage after 1974, 
for various reasons: the maturing of the systems, changes in computation rules 
for the main regimes, and an active policy of revaluation of benefits. 
1. In  1993, the average French pensioner received benefits from  1.4 different basic schemes 
plus an average of 1.1 benetits derived from complementary schemes. Figure 3.3  covers beneficia- 
ries only from the tirst category of regimes. 104  Didier Blanchet and Louis-Paul Pel6 
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Fig. 3.2  Contributors to pension regimes 
Nure: In this figure, the category main basic regimes includes nine basic regimes, which cover 
almost the entire employed population. The figure also shows separate figures for three regimes: 
the general regime, which covers wage earners from the private sector, the regime for farmers, and 
the civil servants' pension scheme. 
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Fig. 3.3  Pensioners in the basic regimes 
Nore: The figure shows the number of pensioners in  the different basic regimes. As in fig. 3.2 
above, the total number refers to the nine basic regimes. As is discussed in the text, a retiree may 
receive pensions from several basic regimes (the average number of basic pensions is I .4).  There- 
fore, the last category shows the total number of pensions but overstates the total number of re- 
tirees. 
Yet these general and progressive changes do not account for the evolution 
of labor force participation rates since the 1980s, which must be more narrowly 
linked to changes in the legal retirement  age and to the extension  of  other 
forms of  exit from the labor force, that is, the development of  preretirement 
schemes. 105  Social Security and Retirement in France 
Fig. 3.4  Ratio of average old age benefit to average wage 
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Fig. 3.5 
(LF = labor force) 
Source; Bordes and Guillemot (1994). 
Historical trends in the labor force participation of older men 
3.1.2  Detailed Trends since 1960 
During this period, the participation rate among workers over age fifty-five 
decreased by more than 50 percent, from 31.5 to 15 percent. Among workers 
over age sixty, it fell from 22.5 to 4.8 percent. Such dramatic decreases in the 
participation rates of older workers had never been observed before. 
Their first consequence is that hardly any individuals over age seventy are 
employed. For instance, the participation rate of men between the ages of sev- 
enty and seventy-four was divided by ten between  1970 and 1995 (from 15.2 
to  1.5 percent). The age group sixty-five to sixty-nine also disappeared from 
the labor force almost completely: rates amount to 3.7 percent for men and 2.5 
percent for women, as opposed to, respectively, 30.6 and 15 percent in 1968. 
Second, the age group sixty to sixty-four experienced the most substantial de- 
crease in the participation rate over the same period, from 65.7 to 16.5 percent 
among men (fig. 3.5) and from 32.4 to 14.6 percent among women (fig. 3.6). 106  Didier Blanchet and Louis-Paul Pel6 
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Fig. 3.6  Historical trends in the labor force participation of older women 
(LF = labor force) 
Source: Bordes and Guillemot (1994). 
Finally, the participation rate for men between the ages of fifty-five and fifty- 
nine decreased from 82.5 to 68.9 percent. 
Rates for women have long been fluctuating, with a continuous increase in 
female activity at median ages counteracting the effect of earlier exit from the 
labor force. The second effect dominated in the age group sixty to sixty-four 
until recently, while the first one dominated constantly in the age group fifty- 
five to fifty-nine (fig. 3.6). 
On the whole, the average age of people withdrawing from the labor force 
fell by 4.5 years between 1969 and 1993, from 62 to 58.5. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 
also show the specific role played by  preretirement  schemes and unemploy- 
ment insurance in explaining the drop among men of employment rates (not 
only labor force participation rates) in these age groups. They played the major 
role in the decline of  employment between the ages of  sixty and sixty-four 
until the mid-l980s, after which they have been taken over by the progressive 
application of retirement at age sixty. It was during the same period that pre- 
retirement before age sixty developed, affecting about 20 percent of the age 
group. Rates of preretirement have remained at this level since the end of the 
1980s. 
3.1.3  The Current Situation 
The current situation is summarized in figures 3.9-3.12. Detailed profiles of 
occupation and labor force participation by  age are given in figures 3.9 and 
3.10. Activity and employment both start declining around age fifty-five, doing 
so in a quasi-linear fashion until age sixty, at which point their values are be- 
tween 30 and 40 percent. They then drop rapidly, only a small portion of the 
population remaining at work after age sixty-two, which proportion quits the 
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Fig. 3.7  Status of active male workers aged 60-64 from 1968 to 1995 
Source: Blanchet and Marioni (1996). 
Figures 3.1 1 and 3.12 give more details concerning the link between age and 
status between the ages of fifty and seventy-five. Inactive people are broken 
down into retired and other inactive; for men, the latter category includes a 
large fraction of preretired people between the ages of fifty-five and sixty, Ac- 
tive people are broken down into employed and unemployed, the latter cate- 
gory peaking at age fifty-six, then declining progressively until age sixty, with 
transfers from this category to the categories of retired or preretired. Parallel 
patterns exist for women, with the difference that a larger share can be classi- 
fied as other inactive at all ages, even after the normal retirement age. It must 
be noted, however, that the data for these two graphs are obtained from self- 
declarations on the Employment Survey, the categories of which do not per- 
fectly  coincide with  administrative  definitions  of  unemployment,  preretire- 
ment, or retirement. 
Moving to the measurement of income resources for households whose head 
is retired, table 3.1 gives the distribution between work income, pension ben- 
efits, minimum old age benefits,  and capital income, according  to previous Employed workers  Unemployed workers exempted from job seeking 
0  Unemployed workers  Preretired workers  Other inactive 
Fig. 3.8 
Source: Blanchet and Marioni (1996). 
Status of active male workers aged 55-59  from 1968 to 1995 
Fig. 3.9  Labor force participation (LFP) rates by age and sex 
Source: Employment Survey 1996. -  Male Employment Rate  +  Female Employment Rate 
Fig. 3.10  Employment rates by age and sex 
Source: Employment Survey 1996. 
1 -  emploved  --c unemDloved -  retired  +  other inactive  1 
Fig. 3.11 
Source: Employment Survey 1996. 
Distribution of activities of men by age 
1 -  emDloved  -  unemoloved -  retired  +  other inactive  1 
Fig. 3.12  Distribution of activities of women by age 
Source; Employment Survey 1996. 110  Didier Blanchet and Louis-Paul Pel6 
Table 3.1  Distribution of Household Income by Source (households whose head 
is inactive) 
Share of  Each Source in % 
Activity  Minimum  Property 
Earnings  Pensions  Pension  Income 
Total  6.  I  76.2  5.3  12.4 
Former status of  head: 
Farmer  6.1  59.8  17.9  16.2 
Wage earner  6.0  82.4  2.8  8.8 
Other  6.9  65.5  12.1  15.5 
Independent worker  6.2  54.  I  4.8  34.9 
Source: Taxable Earnings Survey 1984 
activity. Various pension income or other public subsidies constitute the major 
part of total income for households whose head was previously a wage earner. 
Capital income plays a larger role for former self-employed workers and work- 
ers from the agricultural sector, the latter also relying heavily on minimum old 
age benefits.  In all cases, by construction  (household head  is retired), work 
income plays a minor role. 
On the whole, these various income sources result in an average standard of 
living for retired households that is roughly equal to the average standard of 
living of active households. This contrasts with the situation that prevailed up 
to the 1970s and that led to the strong policy in favor of pension revaluation 
illustrated in figure 3.4 above. 
3.2  Structure and Rules of  Retirement Schemes 
Two difficulties arise when one attempts to describe the French pension sys- 
tem. The first is due to its complexity, that is, the coexistence of many different 
regimes covering various segments of the population. We give a brief overview 
of the various regimes, but we then concentrate on the system that concerns 
the majority  of  the population, the combination of the basic general regime 
and mandatory complementary schemes organized on a socioprofessional ba- 
sis  (ARRCO  [Association  de Regimes  de Retraite  ComplCmentaires]  and 
AGIRC [Association GCnCrale des Institutions de Retraite des Cadres]), all of 
them being pay-as-you-go systems. 
The second difficulty comes from the fact that the rules of these systems are 
not fixed but change over time. We concentrate here on the rules that prevailed 
at the beginning of the 1990s. Concerning the general regime, these rules es- 
sentially resulted from a reform introduced in 1983 that allowed retirement at 
a full rate at age sixty. 
We then complete this presentation by providing information on (a)  the sys- 
tem of preretirement, which, beside the rules governing normal pensions, plays 111  Social Security and Retirement in France 
a large role in shaping labor force participation rates between the ages of fifty- 
five and fifty-nine, and (6)  the reforms introduced since 1993, starting with a 
reform of the general regime whose consequences should progressively affect 
new cohorts of retirees until the first decade of the next century. 
3.2.1  The Different Regimes 
The French system is often considered to be complex, but its structure can 
nevertheless be summed up simply in the following way: 
For most of the population (wage earners from the private sector), the pen- 
sion relies on two pillars: (1) The first is the basic general regime, which offers 
benefits corresponding to the share of wages below a social security cei1ing.l 
We hereafter use the term social security to describe this segment of the sys- 
tem, even if it does not exactly correspond to the French conventions.’ In 1992, 
70.5 percent of people over age sixty received  a social security pension. On 
the contributors’ side, the same year, the general regime covered 64.8 percent 
of the labor force. (2) The second pillar is complementary schemes, organized 
on a socioprofessional basis. These schemes developed between  1946 and the 
mid-1960s. They consist of a large number (about 180) of specific regimes, 
but these regimes are federated in two main organisms ensuring interregime 
demographic compensation: (a)  AGIRC for executive workers and only for the 
fraction  of their wages over the social security ceiling  and (b)  ARRCO for 
other workers and executives’ wages below the ceiling. In 1972, contributing to 
a complementary scheme became compulsory. Today, complementary schemes 
provide 40 percent of retirement pensions for wage earners in the private sector 
(Join-Lambert et al. 1994, 366). 
Beside this simple two-pillar structure, the complexity of the French system, 
in fact, is principally due to the existence of a large number of exceptions to 
this general rule of organization. These exceptions are the result of two factors. 
When social security was created in 1945, people who already benefited from 
more generous dispositions refused to join the new system (e.g., people be- 
longing to the public sector). Some categories preferred, on the other hand, to 
adopt cheaper systems offering lower protection because they thought that a 
large part of their retirement needs was likely to be covered by other sources, 
such as professional capital for the self-employed. Beside the two-pillar system 
constituted by the general regime and ARRCO/AGIRC, we therefore have a 
multiplicity  of  special  regimes  and  regimes  for  self-employed  workers 
applying specific rules. For instance, there are about 120 first-pillar retirement 
2. In 1994, the gross value of the social security ceiling was Fr 12,760, while the average gross 
wage was Fr 12,280. 
3. In the French system, the term social security (siccurire‘  sociale) is used to characterize all the 
basic social insurance schemes that were set up in 1945: health insurance, family allowances, work 
injuries, and basic pensions. The French social security system does not limit itself, as does social 
security in the United States, to the public pension scheme. We use social security here to describe 
the intersection of the pension field and the field of sicuriti sociale in the French sense of the term. 112  Didier Blanchet and Louis-Paul Pel6 
schemes other than the general regime. In particular, it must be observed that 
civil servants are not really covered by an autonomous pension system since 
their pensions are paid directly through the state budget. 
For all categories of people, there is, at last, a system of minimum pension 
(minimum vieillesse),  which is a means-tested allowance. The size of the popu- 
lation benefiting from this minimum pension has regularly declined in the past, 
owing to the increasing maturity of  normal pensions. It is now a little over 1 
million, as opposed to 2.55 million  in  1959 (Commissariat GCntral du Plan 
1995). 
3.2.2  Benefits and Contributions: General Regime 
and Complementary Schemes 
regime and complementary schemes. 
Benefits from the General Regime 
The general regime offers contributory benefits corresponding to the share 
of wages below the social security ceiling. We consider the rules that prevailed 
between  1983 and the beginning of the 1990s and that, until now, have been 
only little affected by changes introduced in  1993, whose application will be 
very progressive. Under these rules, the pension was computed on the basis of 
several criteria. It was proportional to the number of years contributed (trun- 
cated to 37.5 years) and to a reference wage, which used to be the average 
wage of the ten best years of the pensioner’s career (past nominal wages being 
reevaluated  at time of  liquidation according to a set of  retrospective coeffi- 
cients). The formula was therefore 
We now give more details about the calculation of pensions for the general 
no. of years, truncated to 37.5 
37.5 
pension  = a x 
x (average wage of the 10 best years), 
the proportionality coefficient a being itself modulated. It was maximal when 
the pensioner left, at age sixty, with 37.5 years of contributions or more; in that 
case, its value was set at 50 percent, and this exactly ensured a replacement 
rate of the reference wage (not necessarily the last wage) equal to 50 percent. 
The same value of a also applied, whatever the number of years of contribu- 
tions, when the individual left at age sixty-five. In all other cases, the coeffi- 
cient was reduced either by  1.25 percentage point for each term  missing  to 
reach the value of 150 terms or by 1.25 percentage point for each term missing 
to reach age sixty-five, the formula to be used being the one that lead to the 
most favorable outcome. 
This system means that the number of years of contributions affects the pen- 
sion level in two ways, which may imply, in some cases, a very strong depen- 
dency between age at retirement and pension level. To provide a full under- 113  Social Security and Retirement in France 
Table 3.2  Replacement Rate Provided by the General Regime for Three 
Reference Cases 
Number of  CY  Number of  Replacement 
Years of  (%I  Yearsl37.5  Ratio (%) 






























































































standing of this interaction, table 3.2 shows the consequences of this system for 
three reference cases with individuals arriving at age sixty with, respectively, 
twenty-five, thirty, and thirty-five years of contributions. 
The first person must wait until age sixty-five to retire at a full rate a (SO 
percent). Even so, however, his pension will be reduced by the fact that he has 
only thirty years of contributions at this age. His replacement ratio will there- 
fore be equal only to 30/37.S of  the maximum replacement  ratio, which is 
equal to SO percent. Note that, at each age under sixty, the downward adjust- 
ment of a  is computed on the basis of the number of years shy of age sixty- 
five, rather than the number of years shy of a value of N = 37.5, since the rule 
consists in applying the most favorable of the two adjustments. 
The second individual must also wait until age sixty-five to retire at the full 
rate CY.  but will benefit at this age by a higher replacement rate, equal to 35137.5 
times the maximum replacement ratio of  SO percent. In this case, again, the 
downward adjustment before age sixty-five is based on the number of years 
shy of age sixty-five. 
The third individual will not have to wait until age 65. He will benefit from 
the maximum replacement rate as soon as he reaches a cumulated number of 
years of contributions equal to 37.5, that is, at age 62.5. If he decided to leave 114  Didier Blanchet and Louis-Paul Pelt? 
between the ages of 60 and 62.5, the downward adjustment would be computed 
according to the number of years shy of the total of 37.5 years of contributions, 
rather than the number of years shy of age 65, since the first rule is now the 
most generous. Note also that, for this individual, working past age 62.5 does 
not bring any further advantage in terms of pension level. 
Some additional observations must be added to this presentation of the gen- 
eral regime. First, some people have been successively affiliated with different 
schemes, especially in older cohorts: for instance, people moving from agricul- 
ture or self-employment to the status of wage earner in industry or services. 
These people will collect two basic pensions, one from their initial regime and 
one from the general regime. The latter will be proportional to the number of 
years spent in this regime, according to formula (l), yet coefficient CY will be 
evaluated taking into account the total number of years of contributions, what- 
ever the regime. Reductions in a,  furthermore, do not apply in certain cases: 
veterans, disabled workers, and female workers who have twenty-four years of 
contributions and have raised three children. 
Formula (1) also implies that, at the time they  are claimed, pensions  are 
computed in current nominal French francs. They are then reevaluated each 
year on a discretionary basis. During the  1970s and early  1980s, the general 
policy was to overindex these pensions in order to make up for the initial gap 
between  the standard of living of workers and that of  pensioners.  Since the 
mid-l980s, the practice has instead consisted in an indexation on prices. 
BeneJts fiom Complementary Schemes: ARRCO and AGIRC 
These schemes are almost fully  contributive.  Pensions  are computed  ac- 
cording to a system of points. Points are accumulated during the worker’s ca- 
reer in proportion to his contributions: the contribution rate is fixed, and one 
franc contributed in year t is considered equivalent to the formal buying of  1/ 
RW points, where RW,  in the system terminology,  constitutes the reference 
wage (salaire de rLfLrence, which is in fact the price of one point). The pension 
is then equal to the total number of points accumulated over the pensioner’s 
career, multiplied by a coefficient  V (valeur du point), which is fixed every 
year. 
For a pensioner  who began working at time to and stopped at time t,,  the 
formula for pension at time t can therefore be written as 
”  T(t’)W(f’) 
r’=r”  RW(t’)  ’ 
pension  =  v(t)  .  2 
where ~(t’)  and w(t’)  are, respectively, the contribution rate and the worker’s 
wage at time t’.  As explained above, only a fraction of the wage is taken into 
account  for computing  contributions  and points  accumulated  each year:  for 
nonexecutives, the wage is truncated to three social security ceilings, and con- 
tributions are collected by ARRCO; for executives, contributions are collected 115  Social Security and Retirement in France 
Table 3.3  Current Features of Complementary Schemes (1993) 
ARRCO  AGIRC 
Contractual contribution  rate (% of gross wages)  5  13 
Reference wage (Fr)  21.18  19.69 
Value of point (Fr)  2.24  2.36 
by ARRCO for the part of the wage below the ceiling and by AGIRC for the 
segment of the wage falling above the ceiling up to four times the ceiling. 
Contribution rates, reference wages, and values of points that prevail are not 
the same in both schemes. Table 3.3 gives levels for 1993. 
Concerning retirement age in these complementary schemes, the normal re- 
tirement age remains theoretically sixty-five, even after the 1983 reform, which 
introduced retirement at age sixty in the general regime. For retirement under 
age sixty-five, a quasi-actuarial  adjustment is  supposed to be  applied. But, 
since the 1983 reform, this adjustment is not applied to people who fulfill the 
conditions for a basic retirement at the full rate (more than 37.5 years of contri- 
butions). The resulting extra expenditures for the complementary schemes are 
supported by a specific entity, financed through various contributions: the As- 
sociation pour la Structure Financike. This simply means that complementary 
schemes have been de facto transformed in schemes where normal retirement 
is at age sixty, but without bearing its cost (or bearing it only in terms of for- 
gone contributions). 
Taxation, Contributions, Earnings Tests 
Taxation rules differ for pensions and wages. A certain number of contribu- 
tions concern only wage earners. Pensioners are exempted from these contribu- 
tions. This is the case for contributions to unemployment insurance, at a rate 
of about 3.2 percent. This is also the case for contributions to pension schemes, 
at  the  following rates:  for the  general regime, 6.55 percent  of the fraction 
of  the  wage below  the  social security  ceiling; for complementary  schemes 
(ARRCO and AGIRC), 2 percent of  the  wage below  three  times the social 
security ceiling to ARRCO for nonexecutives and 2 percent of the wage below 
the social security ceiling to ARRCO and 4.68 percent of the fraction of  the 
wage between one and four times the social security ceiling to AGIRC for ex- 
ecutives. 
It must be added that, concerning complementary schemes, these basic con- 
tribution  rates-which  are  the  ones  used  to  compute the  accumulation  of 
points and future entitlements-are  now systematically affected by majoration 
coefficients, which are now equal to 125 percent in both regimes. This is an 
additional tax, meaning that points are, in fact, purchased 25 percent above 
their face value. 
We next have contributions that concern both wage earners and pensioners, 116  Didier Blanchet and Louis-Paul Pel6 
Table 3.4  Some Contribution Rates (%) 
Employee or 
Protected 








Wages below the ceiling 
Full wage 
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ceiling (AGIRC) 









3 (X 1.25) 
9.36 (X 1.21) 








2 (X 1.25) 
4.68 (X 1.21) 









5 (X 1.25) 
14.04 (X 1.21) 
5 (X 1.25) 
Sources: Join-Lambert et al. (1994); Legros (1995). 
"The multiplicative coefficient refers to the concept calling rates (faux  dbppel); i.e., there is a 
basic statutory contribution rate, but the real contribution rate is obtained after multiplication by 
the calling rate, which was lower than one during the first decades of existence of the system and 
now increases more or less regularly. 
but at different rates. This is the case of contributions to health  insurance, 
whose rates are 6.8 percent on wages, 1.4 percent on pensions from the general 
regime, and 2.4 percent on complementary pensions. 
We then have taxes or contributions that are similar for both sources of  in- 
come. These are the generalized social contribution (CSG), introduced in 1988, 
whose rate is now equal to 2.4 percent and whose aim is to finance a certain 
number of noncontributive allowances, and the personal income tax, which is 
progressive and whose rules are almost the same for pensions and wages (the 
only difference consists in a tax allowance on wages whose aim is to compen- 
sate for expenditures linked to professional activity). 
Table 3.4 shows these different rates. In addition, it gives the rates for contri- 
butions paid by employers. 
Concerning at last earnings tests in the attribution of  pensions,  the rules 
differ across regimes, but we can generally consider that they strongly discour- 
age the continuation of activity after the claiming of the pension. Concerning 
the general regime, there is no formal impossibility of combining benefits with 
labor income, but claiming pension rights implies the interruption of the labor 
relation  with the current employer. The only possibility  is then to combine 117  Social Security and Retirement in France 
benefits with independent work or to work for another employer, a possibility 
that will concern only a small minority. Furthermore, concerning complemen- 
tary schemes, starting a new activity generally leads to the interruption of ben- 
efits. 
3.2.3  Preretirement 
Preretirement systems developed in France in several steps. We can distin- 
guish between two main periods, before and after the lowering of the normal 
retirement age to sixty in 1983. 
Preretirement During the 1970s 
The first period was dominated by  measures concerning workers between 
the ages of sixty and sixty-four. The first measure dates back as early as 1963, 
when  a specific  allowance  (ASFNE, a special allowance from the National 
Fund for Employment) was created to help workers aged sixty or over who had 
been laid off. This allowance has been progressively replaced, starting in 1972, 
by a system of resource maintenance (garunties  de ressources).  It ensured that 
workers over age sixty who lost their jobs would receive 60-70  percent of their 
last income up to age sixty-five, which was then the normal retirement age. 
This  system  was  extended  considerably  in  1983, covering  up  to  400,000 
people, roughly one-quarter of the population in the age bracket sixty to sixty- 
four. Some allowances were also introduced for workers under age sixty, but 
only in specific sectors suffering from very large employment problems, such 
as the iron industry. 
It is in this context that retirement at age sixty was introduced in 1983. One 
implication of this highly symbolic reform is that it acted primarily as a pure 
substitution process, normal pensioners progressively replacing people bene- 
fiting from resource maintenance programs. This explains why the reform did 
not produce any significant break in the evolution of activity, as can be seen by 
reference to figures 3.1 and 3.5 above. 
This does not mean, however, that the reform was completely neutral. First, 
it changed considerably the nature and the reversibility of the protection that 
was offered: there was a shift from a kind of unemployment insurance to a 
quasi-universal pension system. Second, this change created a further impulse 
to a lowering of activity rates before age sixty. The introduction of retirement 
at age sixty was initially expected to eliminate the necessity  of any form of 
preretirement. But, in the face of a still rising rate of unemployment, and in a 
period  of  rapid  industrial reconversion,  it  quickly  became  apparent  that  it 
would be necessary to reintroduce some form of  special safety net for workers 
younger than the normal retirement age. 
Preretirement since 1983 
In the second period, preretirement developed along two lines, in propor- 
tions that have varied over time and that reflect the fluctuating desire of the 
state to control the process. The first measure taken was the reactivation of the 118  Didier Blanchet and Louis-Paul Pel6 
ASFNE: people who are entitled to such benefits have left their firms under 
specific conditions resulting from negotiations between the firm and the state. 
The second measure, which implies much less control, consists in specific dis- 
positions  of  the French system of unemployment insurance. Under the com- 
mon rule, people falling into unemployment are entitled to compensation for 
a limited period of  time; since  1992, this  compensation  decreases with the 
duration of unemployment. But these rules do not apply to people who lose 
their jobs after a certain age (fifty-seven until mid-I 993, now fifty-eight), who 
can benefit from full compensation until they are able to take the normal pen- 
sion at the full rate. This system is not officially described as preretirement, 
and it differs from a pension system in that people are eligible to receive bene- 
fits under it only if they have been laid off by their employer. 
It must be noted that the coexistence of these two systems generates prob- 
lems  for the  measurement  of  labor force participation  rates  for  these  age 
groups: Truly preretired  people  are naturally counted  as inactive.  However, 
those collecting unemployment insurance can be considered both as active and, 
since they are generally exempt from actively seeking jobs, as inactive (ac- 
cording to international conventions). The situation is even more ambiguous 
when labor force status is self-declared, as was the case for some of the statis- 
tics given in section 3.1 above. 
3.2.4  Recent or Ongoing Reforms 
A reform of  the general regime was enacted in  1993 the main features of 
which are the following:  (a)  After liquidation, pensions  will be indexed on 
prices instead of on either net or gross wages. This measure will have the effect 
of  reducing the relative  standard of  living of  older pensioners.  In fact, this 
measure essentially establishes as official what had become the standard prac- 
tice over the last decade. Nevertheless,  in the case of  rapid increases of  net 
wages (high productivity growth), some occasional and discretionary reindex- 
ation could be introduced (clause de rendez vous). (b)  Retirement at age sixty 
will remain possible, but, in order to receive the full rate, the number of years 
of contributions will be raised from 37.5 under the current rule to 40 in 2003. 
(c) The reference wage used in the formula (1) above will progressively  be 
computed on a greater number of years, from the best ten years initially to the 
best twenty-five years in 2008. 
No similar reform has been applied, at this stage, to any of the special re- 
gimes.  The attempted  extension  of  these  new  rules-now  suspended-to 
some of these regimes was in fact one of the reasons behind the controversy 
that arose in November  1995 over the JuppC Plan. 
Measures to reform complementary schemes have so far consisted mainly 
in increasing contractual rates (a policy  that has the drawback  of  increasing 
future rights), in increasing calling rates (this policy does not have the same 
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ing the value of  the point. Certain noncontributory advantages were also re- 
duced. But a different policy, increasing the reference wage, is now being im- 
plemented. This policy amounts to reducing future benefits without changing 
the current level of contributions. It is equivalent to an anticipation of future 
reductions of the value of the point. 
3.3  Retirement Incentives 
Is behavior consistent with the incentives generated by the pension system 
and especially with the incentives generated in  1983 by  the introduction of 
retirement at age sixty? We look first at the informal evidence given by hazard 
rates derived from the profiles given in section 3.1 and from other sources. 
We then move to more formal computations of  social security entitlements at 
different ages. Given the difficulty of dealing with special regimes, we limit 
ourselves to the “normal” case of  a worker affiliated with the general regime 
and compulsory complementary schemes of the ARRCO/AGIRC group. 
3.3.1  Informal Evidence 
Figures 3.13-3.16  reveal patterns of behavior that seem qualitatively consis- 
tent with the main features of  the pension  systems that have just been  de- 
scribed. Figure 3.13 and 3.14 give, for men and women, rates of exit from the 
labor force directly  derived from the labor force participation rates used in 
figure 3.9 above. These transition rates have been computed using two succes- 
sive realizations of this survey, in 1995 and 1996. They show that exits from 
the  labor force occur continuously between  the ages of fifty-five and sixty, 
when they can be attributed to preretirement schemes, then peak with entry 
into normal  retirement  at age sixty. There are residual exits after age sixty, 
probably people who are not eligible to retire at the full rate at age sixty; the 
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Fig. 3.13  Hazard rate out of the labor force for men 
Source: Employment Survey 1995, 1996. 120  Didier Blanchet and Louis-Paul Pel6 
-0,l 
50  52  54  56  58  60  62  64  66  68 
Fig. 3.14  Hazard rate out of the labor force for women 
Source: Employment Survey 1995, 1996. 
relative importance of such cases is apparently greater for women, who, owing 
to shorter careers, are less likely to arrive at age sixty with 37.5 years of past 
contributions and who are then forced to wait until age sixty-five to retire. 
Figure 3.15 gives more details  concerning  the link between  age and the 
probability of claiming one’s benefits, rather than exit from the labor force. 
The data are derived from a panel of pensioners established in 1986 by SESI 
(the statistical office of the French Ministry of  Social Affairs). Data for five 
cohorts of pensioners, born in  1906, 1912, 1918, 1922, and 1926, were col- 
lected directly from pension funds. The ages at which these successive cohorts 
entered normal retirement are available. This sample allows us to assess the 
effect of the 1983 reform. Before 1983, some workers could retire from the 
labor force at age sixty, but most had to make due with preretirement schemes, 
and the age at which they claimed benefits from the general regime remained 
equal to sixty-five-hence  the predominant peak at sixty-five for the 1912 co- 
hort. The 1983 reform, which lowered the normal retirement age to sixty, made 
these preretirement  schemes pointless, and workers began claiming benefits 
from the general regime at age sixty. Hence, the age at which benefits were 
claimed decreased, with a progressive shift to a situation where the predomi- 
nant spike is at age sixty, after a transition period characterized by bimodal pro- 
files. 
Figure 3.15 relies on the distribution of retirement age within each cohort. 
From these data, we can compute hazard rates giving, at each age, the instanta- 
neous probability of retiring. Figure 3.16 shows hazard rate profiles within the 
same four cohorts. Here again, the ages of sixty and sixty-five play a specific 
role. The spike at age sixty-five remains high over time, with retirement oc- 
curring then for at least 70 percent of workers still working at this age. If the 
1983 reform did not change this behavior, it strongly increased the probability 
of  claiming at age sixty, the corresponding hazard rate rising from about  10 
percent in the  1912 cohort to 40 percent in the 1926 cohort. Thus, after the 121  Social Security and Retirement in France 
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Fig. 3.15  Age of entry into normal retirement within four cohorts (percentage 
retiring at each age) 
Source: Dangerfield (1994). 
reform, fewer workers stay in the labor force until age sixty-five, even though 
sixty-five remains the upper bound of the retirement age. More people are eli- 
gible to receive a full pension and therefore retire before age sixty-five, notably 
at age sixty. 
3.3.2  Simulation Modeling 
Our analysis focuses on workers’ entitlements from social security (includ- 
ing  mandatory  complementary  schemes). Precisely,  social  security  wealth 
(SSW) is defined as the weighted sum of future pensions and contributions, all 
terms being discounted from the time of evaluation by both a discount rate for 
time preference and the worker’s survival probability at each date. All compu- 
tations are supposed to apply to a worker aged fifty-five years. Thus, probabili- 
ties are defined conditionally on survival at age fifty-five. All amounts are eval- 
uated  at  this  age,  which  allows  comparisons  of  social  security  wealth  at 
different dates. The detailed formula for social security wealth is given in the 
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Source: Dangerfield (1994). 
Note: These hazard rates are calculated from distribution data contained in fig. 3.15 above. 
Hazard rates into normal retirement within four cohorts 
Several elements enter the calculation of social security wealth. In order to 
determine the level of pensions, we follow the rules of the general regime to 
compute benefits for the worker and his survivor. Here, computations are run 
only on a yearly basis (not a monthly  one). Each year, pensions are revised 
according to the price index (up to 1982, they used to be indexed on the mean 
gross wage, which was more favorable). We follow standard assumptions about 
the future values of  price and wage growth. We use specific sex-cohort-age 
life tables to adjust for survival prospects. We subtract contributions4 to social 
security and complementary schemes while the worker is still working. 
In France, receiving  a pension from the general regime requires that one 
stop working for one's current employer; the result is that we can assume that 
the age at exit from the labor force cannot be higher than the age at which a 
pension is claimed. Can it be lower? Two cases must be considered: (a)  For 
people retiring after age sixty, we assume that the two ages exactly coincide. 
4.  We consider here contributions from both the worker and the employer since, whatever their 
origin, contributions entail a decrease in present earnings in order to obtain entitlements to future 
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As in the United States, these decisions are not systematically the best insofar 
as, if the worker is not entitled to a pension at the full rate at an early age, he 
may increase his entitlements simply by waiting to retire. Nevertheless, empiri- 
cally, most workers are entitled to a pension at the full rate at the time of retire- 
ment, and there is therefore no profit in postponing claiming benefits. (b)  On 
the contrary, we assume that people leaving work before age sixty delay claim- 
ing their pension until  age sixty. Since sixty is the youngest age at which a 
pension  can be claimed, at least under the general  regime,  this  is the only 
reasonable assumption that can be made. 
We run our computations for different types of worker. In the base case, we 
consider a worker from the 1930 cohort and reconstitute his earnings history 
as follows. From empirical data, we evaluate the median wage of male workers 
from the 1930 cohort between  1967 and 1994. We complete this profile back- 
ward according to the mean wage index. From the data, we get a profile up 
to age sixty-four. But, owing to a rapid decrease in the participation  rate, a 
nonnegligible  selection bias5 affects the estimation of the median wage after 
age fifty-five. For this reason, we follow the correction suggested in Diamond 
and Gruber (chap. 11 in this volume), assuming that earnings stay constant in 
real terms from age fifty-one on. 
In the base case, the real discount rate for time preference is set to 3 percent. 
The worker's wife was born in 1933. We assume that she did not work during 
her life and that she cannot therefore claim a pension in her own right. As  a 
survivor, she is entitled to a pension that amounts to slightly over 50 percent 
of her husband's. 
Besides  social  security wealth, we  can compute other indicators  varying 
with the retirement age. First, we calculate replacement rates, after the deduc- 
tion of social contributions and income taxes. To take into account taxes on 
income, we must make assumptions  about household  composition  since, in 
France, the level at which taxes are levied depends on the number of depen- 
dents. We consider the simple situation of a "fiscal household" with no chil- 
dren, the family comprising either a single worker or a couple. 
We then compute accrual values, defined as the difference between the val- 
ues of social security wealth in two following years. We describe below the 
different factors accounting for the change in social security wealth between 
two years. We  compare this accrual to the value of social security wealth by 
computing the accrual rate. Finally, in order to measure incentives to retire, we 
compare the accrual value to the earnings of the last year of work: the opposite 
5. Contrary to what is observed in the United States, the earnings profile observed in France 
after age sixty does not decline but increases. Two reasons may explain this fact. First, there are 
few part-time workers at this age since everyone is eligible to receive a pension, at least a minimum 
pension from the welfare state, and getting this pension implies stopping work. Second, in the 
framework of  an  earnings-leisure trade-off, incentives to continue working after age sixty are 
strong for high-earnings workers. 124  Didier Blanchet and Louis-Paul Pel6 
Table 3.5  Base-Case Incentive Calculations 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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value of the ratio is called the tadsubsidy rate. When the tadsubsidy rate is 
positive,  working  one more year entails a decline in  social security  wealth, 
which somehow represents a tax on last year’s earnings. 
Results for the  different  cases  are presented  in  sections  3.3.3 and 3.3.4 
below. 
3.3.3  Base-Case Results 
Table 3.5 gives figures for the base case. Each row corresponds to the last 
year of work, ranging from age fifty-four to age sixty-nine. If, at the end of this 
last year of work, the individual is younger than sixty, we assume that he waits 
until age sixty to claim his pension (sixty is the minimum retirement age). In 
other cases, retirement is assumed to start just after the end of  the last year 
worked. 
Table 3.5 first shows replacement rates that appear to be very high (more 
than 90 percent). This finding is consistent with empirical observations from 
various surveys, and the high rates result from several factors. First, benefits 
include (mandatory) complementary pensions; thus, replacement rates can ex- 
ceed the 50 percent full rate from the general regime. Second, pensions bear 
fewer social security taxes than do wages (about 20 percent on wages as op- 
posed to less than 5 percent on pensions). Third, income taxes are progressive, 
and subtracting income taxes therefore raises the replacement ratio. The com- 
bination of all these factors eventually leads to a situation where after-tax pen- 
sions are very close to after-tax wages. Besides, in this base case, the worker 
is entitled to a full-rate pension from the general regime at age sixty; that is 125  Social Security and Retirement in France 
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Fig. 3.17  Taxkubsidy rate across earnings profiles 
why the replacement rate is already very high at this age and then slowly in- 
creases with complementary pensions. 
If we turn to social security wealth and its variations with age, we must refer 
to the interplay between age at claiming and the number of years of contribu- 
tions, which was already illustrated in table 3.2 above.6 In the base case, work- 
ers are assumed to have contributed since age twenty. This implies the follow- 
ing dependency between age at exit from the labor force and social security 
wealth: (a)  Between the ages of 55 and 57.5, one more year of contributions 
has two positive effects: it increases the coefficient (Y by 5 percentage points,’ 
and it increases parameter N (number of years of contributions) by about one- 
thirty-fifth, or 3 percent. This increases the future level of the pension by an 
amount that  is roughly 6-7  percent  of  the average wage. Multiplied  by  the 
length of retirement, which is roughly twenty years, this implies an accrual 
of  social security wealth of more than  100 percent of the wage, which easily 
dominates the loss that results from the fact that the individual will pay one 
more year of contributions. This results in the large “subsidy” observed in the 
last column and depicted in figure 3.17. (b)  At the ages of  fifty-eight and fifty- 
nine, working one more year does not bring any new entitlements to the general 
regime and only a few more entitlements to complementary  schemes. It does 
not change the length of the retirement period, but it costs one more year of 
contributions. The result is a slight decrease in social security wealth and a 
moderate implicit taxation of labor. (c) The picture is the same after age sixty: 
almost no new entitlements and one more year of  contributions, but with the 
6. Remember that three elements enter into the computation of the basic pension: the average 
wage over the ten best years; the rate a (from 25 to 50 percent, when age rises from sixty to sixty- 
five or when  the number of  years of  contributions increases from 32.5 to 37.5); and the ratio 
of  the number of years of contributions over 37.5. The full rate is defined as a being equal to 
50 percent. 
7. Last year of work at age fifty-seven increases (Y  by  only 2.5 percent because the full rate is 
obtained at age 57.5, after 37.5 years of contributions. 126  Didier Blanchet and Louis-Paul Pel6 
difference that delaying exit from the labor force now reduces the duration of 
retirement. Therefore, one more year of  work reduces social security wealth 
not only by the amount of contributions but also by the value of forgone pen- 
sion. This loss in social security wealth induces an implicit taxation of labor, 
whose rate tends toward the order of magnitude of the replacement ratio.8 
What is the consistency between the results of these computations and actual 
labor force participation rates, reported earlier? Taken literally, these theoreti- 
cal computations would suggest that the optimal age at departure is fifty-eight 
years. But actual hazard rates show that real behavior differs in various ways: 
either people leave earlier than this age or later. 
Leaving the work force earlier than age fifty-eight is sometimes the result of 
incentives under specific regimes where very early retirement is possible, but 
in most  cases  it can also be explained by  the  importance of  preretirement 
schemes or the specific rules applying to unemployment benefits at later ages. 
As explained earlier, workers who are laid off before age sixty can benefit, 
under specific conditions, from preretirement schemes or unemployment in- 
surance until they are eligible to receive a full-rate social security pension (at 
at least age sixty). Years spent in one of these schemes are validated as years 
contributing to the basic regime; therefore, pension entitlements increase even 
if the worker is no longer active. In terms of future pensions, workers are not 
penalized. 
Table 3.6 illustrates the consequences of this latter possibility for an individ- 
ual who, between his exit from employment and his access to a pension from 
the general regime at the full rate, would receive unemployment benefits, this 
implying, of course, that his exit from employment results from being laid off 
and is not vo1unta1-y.~  This table shows an apparent incentive to leave the labor 
force between the ages of fifty-six and fifty-seven. Of course, this applies only 
to those individuals who are fired at this age, and the decision to fire an em- 
ployee is made by the employer, not the employee. In order to explain the low 
activity rates beyond this age, we must therefore assume that employers also 
derive benefits from these early exits. But this additional condition is probably 
fulfilled since these early exits offer employers a convenient means of solving 
the problem of excess labor capacity at low social cost.1° 
8. Nevertheless, the taxhubsidy rate differs from the replacement ratio (pensions/wage) for 
several reasons. First, the loss includes contributions in addition to forgone pensions. Then, we 
relate this loss to the gross wage since all taxation rates apply to the gross wage (referring to the 
net wage  would yield higher  taxhbsidy rates). Finally, in the computation of  social security 
wealth, values are affected by  the survival probability of the worker, which makes the absolute 
value of the accrual decrease with age, contrary to the replacement rate. 
9. The coverage of preretirement schemes was very briefly extended, around 1980, to those 
voluntarily leaving a job, but this resulted in an explosion of preretirement expenditures, and the 
scheme was quickly abandoned. 
10. This induces a potential risk of  collusion between employers and  employees, and  some 
specific measures have been introduced to try to prevent it. For example, firms are asked to make 
additional contributions to unemployment insurance for people fired after a given age (Delalande 
contribution, after the measure's creator). Ex ante control is exerted by the state over other forms 127  Social Security and Retirement in France 
Table 3.6  Incentive Calculations-Unemployment  Benefits between Work 
and Retirement 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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On the other hand, those who neither benefit nor suffer from these provi- 
sions generally leave the workforce after age fifty-eight and generally at age 
sixty (see the hazard rates shown in fig. 3.13 above). This is due to the fact that 
sixty  remains  the  minimum  age at which  normal  pension  benefits  can be 
claimed. What the results outlined above show means only that, from the point 
of  view of  the ratio of  benefits to contributions, it would be optimal to stop 
contributing at age fifty-eight and then start receiving benefits at age sixty. But 
this would mean no source of income at all between the ages of fifty-eight and 
sixty, a solution that can be ruled out a prior] for individuals who, generally, 
are liquidity constrained and cannot consider the possibility  of  having no in- 
come source for two years. 
Is there  an  alternative  way  to  compute  social  security  accrual rates  that 
would be more consistent with this behavior? One possibility would be to for- 
bid any lag between interruption of activity and the claiming of pension rights. 
For people  leaving the  workforce  before  age sixty, this  would imply social 
security wealth equal to zero (and even less than zero after subtracting contri- 
butions) since these people would receive no pension at all. This way of com- 
puting social security wealth has not been used here because the results would 
have been both trivial and unrealistic:  an individual who would be forced to 
of preretirement (FNE), the attribution of these kinds of preretirement benefits being conditional 
on the existence of  a social plan prepared by  the firm including some compensatory measures: 
e.g., firms must commit to recruiting a certain number of young workers or to employing middle- 
aged workers for a certain duration, and so on. 128  Didier Blanchet and Louis-Paul Pel6 
leave the workforce before age sixty  will, of course, whatever  his liquidity 
constraint, wait until age sixty to claim his pension. 
3.3.4  Other Cases 
Tables 3.7-3.10  show variations from the base case. Whatever the situation, 
we observe both the importance of the rate of the pension and high values for 
replacement rates. 
In the case of a single worker (table 3.7), the level of social security wealth 
is smaller than in the base case, simply because there are no survivor benefits. 
Besides, although pensions and wages are the same as in the base case, replace- 
ment rates are slightly different because income taxes depend on the number 
of people in the household. However, incentives to retire are the same, with a 
maximum social security wealth for the last year of work at age fifty-seven and 
a high tax on wages for work beyond age sixty. 
Table 3.8 and figure 3.17 above present the results of a wage profile at the 
tenth percentile of the wage distribution. Replacement rates are slightly higher 
than in the base case. The results for social security wealth and the taxhbsidy 
rate are similar to previous results, with positive accrual as long as the level of 
pensions increases, a small decrease at ages fifty-eight and fifty-nine, and then 
a huge decrease after age sixty resulting from forgone benefits. 
In table 3.9, and again in figure 3.17 above, we examine the case of a worker 
at the ninetieth percentile of the wage distribution. Replacement rates are much 
lower than in the base case because of the high level of  wages. Wages taken 
into account in the computation of pensions are capped, in the basic general 
regime (by the social security ceiling) as well as in complementary schemes 
Table 3.7  Incentive Calculations-Single  Worker 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax1 
of Work  Rate  ssw  Accrual  Rate  Subsidy 
54  ...  666,801  ...  ...  ... 
55  ...  740,221  73,420  .ll  -.71 
56  ...  817,607  77,386  .10  -.75 
57  ...  851,928  34,321  .04  -.33 
58  ...  841,109  -  10,819  -.01  .I0 
59  .92  830,107  -11,002  -.01  .ll 
60  .91  756,702  -73,405  ~  .09  .7 1 
61  .93  688,48  I  -68,221  -  .09  .66 
62  .92  62 1,8 19  -66,662  -.lo  .64 
63  .93  559,498  -62,321  -.lo  .60 
64  .93  498,909  -60,589  -.I1  .58 
65  .94  441,338  -57,571  -.12  .56 
66  .94  388,614  -52,724  -.12  .51 
67  .95  337,712  -50,901  -.13  .49 
68  .96  288,461  -49,252  -.15  .48 
69  .96  241.174  -47,287  -.16  .46 129  Social Security and Retirement in France 
Table 3.8  Incentive Calculations-Tenth  Percentile Wage 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
of  Work  Rate  ssw  Accrual  Rate  Subsidy 
54  ...  527,363  ...  ...  ... 
55  ...  589,645  62,282  .I2  -  .96 
56  ...  656,541  66,896  .I1  -  1.03 
57  ...  688,575  32,033  .05  -  .49 
58  ...  685,953  -2,622  .oo  .04 
59  .97  682,757  -3,196  .oo  .05 
60  .96  636,65  1  -46.106  -  .07  .7 1 
61  .97  594,697  -41,954  -  .07  .65 
62  .96  551,248  -43,449  -  .07  .67 
63  .97  5 11,754  -39,494  -  .07  .61 
64  .97  473,039  -38,715  -  .08  .60 
65  .98  437, I88  -35,851  -  .08  .55 
66  .98  404,200  -32,988  -  .08  .5 1 
67  .99  372,53 1  -  3 1,669  -  .08  .49 
68  1  .oo  342,151  -30,380  -  .08  .47 
69  I .oo  313,030  -  29.12 1  -  .09  .45 
Table 3.9  Incentive Calculations-Ninetieth  Percentile Wage 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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(by a higher ceiling). For this reason, even in after-tax values, pensions amount 
to less than 70 percent of wages. However, incentives show the same profile as 
in the base case. 
The next case again stresses that incentives to go on working are strong until 
the worker is entitled to a full-rate pension. Table 3.10 describes results for a 130  Didier Blanchet and Louis-Paul Pel6 
Table 3.10  Incentive Calculations-Incomplete  Earnings History 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax I 
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worker with an incomplete earnings history. We suppose that the worker began 
to work at age 26 and is therefore not entitled to a full pension  at age 60. 
Before age 58.5, the rate of the pension-not  available before age 60-is  25 
percent. Between the ages of 58.5 and 63.5, the rate increases by 5 percent per 
year," from 25 to 50 percent, but, for each year of work after age 60, the worker 
forgoes one year of benefits. Thus, the accrual rate is positive at ages 58 and 
59, remains positive between the ages of 60 and 62 (although smaller than 
before), becomes negative at age 63 because of the limited increase in the rate 
(2.5 percent), and remains negative later. In this case, the relatively small in- 
crease in the pension induced by work at age 63 does not offset the loss of one 
year's pension and thus leads to a decrease in social security wealth. Therefore, 
the maximum value of social security wealth is obtained for a last year of work 
at age 62, that is, for leaving the workforce at age 63, before reaching eligibility 
for the full rate, which is obtained at age 63.5. In fact, if computations were 
made  on  a  quarterly  basis,  we  would  observe  that  social  security  wealth 
reaches its maximum right at age 63.5: here again, there are strong incentives 
not to retire at a reduced rate, even if delaying after age 60 implies giving up 
some pension. Finally, after reaching the full rate, we observe, as in previous 
cases, a heavy tax on work. 
As for the replacement rate, values increase quickly up to the full rate, then 
keep going up slowly. Values are lower than in the base case because of  the 
11. As above, work at ages 58 and 63 induces only a 2.5 percent increase in the pension rate 
since the rate rises only after age 58.5 (32.5 years of contributions) and reaches its maximum at 
age 63.5 (37.5 years of contributions). 131  Social Security and Retirement in France 
shorter  career:  the  worker  accumulated  fewer  points  for  complementary 
schemes. Nevertheless, the replacement rate eventually reaches 90 percent. 
In  all cases, we  get similar results across the board.  Rules of  retirement 
schemes imply that social security wealth is maximized when the pension is 
obtained at the full rate. Early retirement at a reduced rate implies a reduction 
in social security wealth, which means that the system is not actuarially fair. 
The evidence is particularly clear in the case of an incomplete earnings history, 
where, between the ages of  sixty and sixty-two, when it is possible immedi- 
ately to claim a pension,  it is still profitable to delay retirement  in order to 
increase the pension level. On the other hand, beyond the full rate, further work 
entails a decrease in social security wealth, which acts as a tax on earnings. 
3.4  Conclusion 
There is little doubt that the question of knowing what determines  age at 
retirement  in France and what may drive its future evolution is particularly 
important.  France  has  labor force participation  rates  at older ages that  are 
among the lowest among similar developed countries, and, like all these coun- 
tries, France is faced with the prospect  of  a rapidly aging population during 
the first half of the next century, a problem whose partial solution may lie in 
an increase in the retirement age. 
This paper provides a partial explanation of current labor force participation 
rates in France. The age at which benefits are claimed is roughly consistent 
because of the conjunction of two elements: the possibility of retiring, under 
certain conditions, and receiving a full pension at age sixty and the fact that a 
majority of people are presently able to do so. 
Although we did not attempt to make any projections, these kinds of compu- 
tations may prove useful in assessing the effect of future changes in these two 
elements. The first change is that, over the next decade, future cohorts will face 
a progressive strengthening of the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to 
take full retirement at age sixty, following the implementation of the Balladur 
reform of 1993. The second change is that these cohorts will be characterized 
by  new patterns of labor force participation over their whole life cycles, and 
especially a later age at entry into the labor force, that will make it harder to 
meet these conditions. These two changes will interact cumulatively to lower 
the probability of being able to retire at age sixty. We did not attempt to simu- 
late this aspect because to do so would involve a full projection of labor histor- 
ies at the individual level,12  but it is clear that it is along the lines explored here 
that such simulations should be developed. 
On the other hand, it remains true that the simulation of labor force partici- 
pation  around age sixty goes further than the computation of  incentives pro- 
12. A long-run dynamic micro-simulation model is currently being developed to deal with this 
question, but the results remain too preliminary to be included here. 132  Didier Blanchet and Louis-Paul Pel6 
vided by the single pension system. Interaction with unemployment insurance, 
preretirement schemes, the general situation of the labor market, and the be- 
havior of firms are other aspects of  a complex problem that deserve specific 
treatment and that were touched on here only briefly. 
Appendix 
We first present a general formula to evaluate social security wealth (SSW), 
defined as the present discounted value of social security benefits for a worker 
of age a, and considering retirement at age r, denoted SSW(a,, r).  We use the 
following notation: 
a0 
r  = age at retirement; 
max age = maximum potential age; 
6  = age difference between the worker and his spouse (6 > 0 when the spouse 
is younger); 
p(a)  = probability of worker’s survival at age a conditional on survival at age a,; 
q(aj)  = probability of spouse’s survival at age a,  conditional on survival when the 
B(a)  = amount of retirement benefits at age n conditional on retirement at age r; 
C(a)  = amount of  contribution at age a to social security and complementary 
R(n,la)  = amount of survivor benefits at spouse’s age  conditionally to end of work- 
P  = discount rate. 
We decompose SSW into three elements: 
PB(a,,  r)  = present value at age a,  of future benefits if retirement occurs at age r; 
SSC(a,, r) = present value at age a,  of social security contributions until retirement at 
SuB(ao, r) = present value at age a,  of survivor benefits if the worker retires at age r. 
= worker’s age at evaluation of SSW, 
worker is a,; 
schemes (depends only on the wage at age a); 
er’s activity at age a; and 
age r;  and 
1  SuB(a,, r) = “zl[p(u)  -  p(a + l)] 
a’“,  (1 + p)-, 133  Social Security and Retirement in France 
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